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Abstract
In this paper we identify and characterize an analysis of two problematic aspects
affecting the representational level of cognitive architectures (CAs), namely:
the limited size and the homogeneous typology of the encoded and processed
knowledge. We argue that such aspects may constitute not only a technological
problem that, in our opinion, should be addressed in order to build artificial
agents able to exhibit intelligent behaviours in general scenarios, but also an
epistemological one, since they limit the plausibility of the comparison of the
CAs’ knowledge representation and processing mechanisms with those executed
by humans in their everyday activities. In the final part of the paper further
directions of research will be explored, trying to address current limitations and
future challenges.
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1. Introduction
Handling a considerable amount of knowledge, and selectively retrieving it
according to the needs emerging in different situational scenarios, is an impor-
tant aspect of human intelligence. For this task, in fact, humans adopt a wide
range of heuristics [1] due to their bounded rationality [2]. In this perspective,
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one of the requirements that should be considered for the design, the realiza-
tion and the evaluation of intelligent cognitively-inspired systems should consist
in their ability to heuristically identify, retrieve, and process, from the general
knowledge stored in their artificial Long Term Memory (LTM), that one which
is synthetically and contextually relevant. This requirement, however, is often
neglected. Currently, artificial cognitive systems and architectures are not able,
de facto, to deal with complex knowledge structures that can be even slightly
comparable to the knowledge heuristically managed by humans. In this paper
we will argue that this is not only a technological problem but also, in the light
of the distinction between functionalist and structuralist models of cognition,
an epistemological one. The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section
2 introduces the two main problematic aspects concerning the knowledge level
in cognitive architectures, namely the size and the homogeneous typology of the
encoded knowledge. Section 3 provides a focused review of the Knowledge Level
of four of the most well known and widely used cognitive architectures (namely
SOAR, ACT-R, CLARION and Vector-LIDA) by pointing out the respective
differences and, in the light of our axis of analysis, their problematic issues1. In
doing so we will illustrate the main attempts that have been proposed to address
such problems and we will highlight the current limitations of such proposals.
In the final sections, we present an overview of three different alternative ap-
proaches that can provide a possible solution for dealing with, jointly, both the
size and the knowledge homogeneity problems: namely the Semantic Pointer
Perspective (section 4), the idea of Conceptual Space as intermediate level of
representation connecting connectionist and symbolic approaches (section 5)
and the novel versions of the Hybrid Neuro Symbolic Approaches currently de-
veloped in the field of CAs (section 6). Interestingly all such proposals converge
in suggesting that the neural level of representation can be considered irrele-
vant for attacking the above mentioned problems, and suggest to address these
1In the present paper we will leave aside many other aspects (e.g. those related to the
knowledge acquisition problems) which are related to, and also affect, the problems in focus.
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issues by operating at more transparent and abstract levels of representation.
Section 7, finally, considers the dual process hypothesis as a possible reference
framework for the integration of different types of knowledge processing mecha-
nisms assumed to cooperate in a CA adopting a heterogeneous representational
perspective. As we will show, the advantages provided by the adoption of this
approach are still not completely clear and deserve further investigations.
2. Open Issues: Knowledge Size and Knowledge Homogeneity
Current cognitive artificial systems and architectures are not equipped with
knowledge bases comparable with the conceptual knowledge that humans pos-
sess and use in the everyday life. From an epistemological perspective this
shortcoming represents a problem: in fact, endowing cognitive agents with more
realistic knowledge bases, in terms of both the size and the type of information
encoded, would allow, at least in principle, to test the artificial systems in
situations closer to those encountered by humans in real life. This problem
becomes more relevant if we take into account the knowledge level2 of Cogni-
tive Architectures [4], [5]. While cognitively-inspired systems, in fact, could be
designed to deal with only domain-specific information (e.g. a computer sim-
ulation of a poker player), Cognitive Architectures (CA), on the other hand,
have also the goal and the general objective of testing - computationally - the
2The description of the ’knowledge problems’ affecting the current Cognitive Architectures
(i.e. the knowledge size and the knowledge homogeneity, see below) is provided at the knowl-
edge level in the sense intended by Newell (i.e. we point out that, given the current state of
affairs, the rational behavior of a cognitive artificial agent adopting such architectures can be
predicted as a limited one simply on the basis of the analysis of the content of its available rep-
resentations, its limited knowledge of its goals etc.). On the other hand, the possible solutions
proposed for dealing with these problems, sketched in the final part of the paper, are focused
on what Newell calls the Symbol Level, since they concern the actual information-processing
mechanisms that the system uses in order to reach its goal, given the knowledge that pos-
sesses. The close relations between these two levels is explained in [3]. According to Newell,
this hierarchy of levels (that includes further levels involving the hardware implementation),
characterizes the Physical Symbol System architecture [3].
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general models of mind they implement. Therefore, if such architectures only
process a simplistic amount (and a limited typology) of knowledge, the struc-
tural mechanisms that they implement concerning knowledge processing tasks
(e.g., retrieval, learning, reasoning etc.) can be only loosely evaluated, and com-
pared, w.r.t. those used by humans in similar knowledge-intensive situations.
In other words, from an epistemological perspective, the explanatory power of
their computational simulation is strongly affected (on these aspects see [6], [7],
[8]). This aspect is problematic since this class of systems, designed according to
the “cognition in the loop” approach, aims both at i) detecting novel and hidden
aspects of the cognitive theories by building properly designed computational
models of cognition and ii) at providing technological advancement in the area
of Artificial Intelligence (AI) of cognitive inspiration. In this perspective, purely
functionalist models [9], based on a weak equivalence (i.e. the equivalence in
terms of functional organization) between cognitive processes and AI proce-
dures, are not considered as having a good explanatory power w.r.t. the target
cognitive system taken as source of inspiration. Conversely, the development
of plausible “structural” models of our cognition (based on a more constrained
equivalence between AI procedures and their corresponding cognitive processes)
are assumed to be the way to follow in order to build artificial cognitive models
able to play both an explanatory role about the theories they implement and to
provide advancements in the field of the artificial intelligence research.
By following this line of argument, therefore, we claim that computational
cognitive architectures aiming at providing a knowledge level based on the
“structuralist” assumption should address, at their representational level, both
the problems concerning the limited “size” and “homogeneity” of the encoded
knowledge. Let us explore in more details the nature of such aspects: while the
size problem is intuitively easy to understand (i.e. it concerns the dimension of
the knowledge base available to the agents), the problem concerning the homo-
geneous typology of the encoded knowledge needs some additional clarification
and context. In particular, this problem relies on the theoretical and experi-
mental results coming from Cognitive Science. In this field, different theories
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about how humans organise, reason and retrieve conceptual information have
been proposed. The oldest one, known as “classical” or Aristotelian theory,
states that concepts - the building blocks of our knowledge infrastructure - can
be simply represented in terms of sets of necessary and sufficient conditions
(and this is completely true, for example, for mathematical concepts: e.g. an
EQUILATERAL TRIANGLE can be classically defined as a regular polygon
with 3 corners and 3 sides). In the mid 1970s, however, Rosch’s experimental
results demonstrated its inadequacy for ordinary –or common sense– concepts,
which cannot be described in terms of necessary and sufficient traits [10]. In par-
ticular, Rosch’s results indicate that conceptual knowledge is organized in our
mind in terms of prototypes. Since then, different theories of concepts have been
proposed to explain different representational and reasoning aspects concerning
the typicality or, in other terms, the common-sense effects3. Usually, they are
grouped in three main classes, namely: prototype views, exemplar views and
theory-theories (see e.g., [11], [12]). All of them are assumed to account for
(some aspects of) typicality effects in conceptualization.
According to the prototype view (introduced by Rosch), knowledge about
categories is stored in terms of some representation of the best instances of the
category. For example, the concept BIRD should coincide with a representation
of a prototypical bird (e.g., a robin). In the simpler versions of this approach,
prototypes are represented as (possibly weighted) lists of features.
According to the exemplar view, a given category is mentally represented as a
set of specific exemplars explicitly stored in memory: the mental representation
of the concept BIRD is the set of the representations of (some of) the birds we
encountered during our lifetime.
Theory-theory approaches adopt some form of holistic point of view about
concepts. According to some versions of the theory-theories, concepts are anal-
ogous to theoretical terms in a scientific theory. For example, the concept BIRD
is individuated by the role it plays in our mental theory of zoology. In other ver-
3A review of all the typicality-theories can be found in [11] and in [12].
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sion of the approach, concepts themselves are identified with micro-theories of
some sort. For example, the concept BIRD should be identified with a mentally
represented micro-theory about birds.
Although these approaches have been largely considered as competing ones,
several results (starting from the work of [13]) suggested that human subjects
may use, in different occasions, different representations to categorize concepts.
Such experimental evidence led to the development of the so called “heteroge-
neous hypothesis” about the nature of concepts, hypothesizing that different
types of conceptual representations exist (and may co-exist): prototypes, exem-
plars, theory-like or classical representations, and so on [12]. All such representa-
tions, in this view, constitute different bodies of knowledge and contain different
types of information associated to the the same conceptual entity. Furthermore,
each body of conceptual knowledge is distinguished by specific processes in which
such representations are involved (e.g., in cognitive tasks like recognition, learn-
ing, categorization, etc.). In particular prototypes, exemplars and theory-like
representations are associated with the possibility of dealing with typicality ef-
fects and non-monotonic strategies of reasoning and categorization4, while the
4Let us assume that we have to categorize a stimulus with the following features: “it has
fur, woofs and wags its tail” the result of a prototype-based categorization would be dog, since
these cues are associated to the prototype of dog. Prototype-based reasoning, however, is
not the only type of reasoning based on typicality. In fact, if an exemplar corresponding
to the stimulus being categorized is available, too, it is acknowledged that humans use to
classify it by evaluating its similarity w.r.t. the exemplar, rather than w.r.t. the prototype
associated to the underlying concepts [12, 14]. For example, a penguin is rather dissimilar
from the prototype of bird. However, if we already know an exemplar of penguin, and if we
know that it is an instance of bird, it is easier to classify a new penguin as a bird w.r.t. a
categorization process based on the similarity with the prototype of that category. This type
of common sense categorization is known in literature as exemplars-based categorization (and
in this case the exemplar is favoured w.r.t. the prototype because of the phenomenon known
as old-item effect). Finally, an example of theory-like common sense reasoning is when we
typically associate to a light switch the learned rule that if we turn it “on” then the light
will be provided (this is a non-monotonic inference with a defeasible conclusion). All these
representations, and the corresponding reasoning mechanisms, are assumed to be potentially
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classical representations (i.e. those based on necessary and/or sufficient condi-
tions) are associated with standard deductive mechanism of reasoning5. In the
representational level of the current cognitive architectures the heterogeneity
hypothesis, assuming the availability of different types of knowledge encoded
in a conceptual structure, is almost neglected 6 (even if some differentiations
between the architectures exist, as we will see in the next section)7. In general,
despite some efforts have been done to implicitly address the presented problems
they are, as we will show below, not completely satisfactory for solving, jointly,
both the mentioned limitations.
3. The Knowledge Level in Cognitive Architectures
Cognitive architectures have been historically introduced i) to capture, at
the computational level, the invariant mechanisms of human cognition, includ-
ing those underlying the functions of control, learning, memory, adaptivity,
perception and action [16] and ii) to reach human level general intelligence, by
means of the realization of artificial artifacts built upon them8. During the
last decades many cognitive architectures have been realized, - such as SOAR
[18], ACT-R [19] etc. - and have been widely tested in several cognitive tasks
involving learning, reasoning, selective attention, recognition etc. However, as
previously mentioned, they are affected by the following problem: they are gen-
co-existing according to the heterogeneity approach.
5As before mentioned, an example of standard deductive reasoning is the categorization
as triangle of a stimulus described by the features: “it is a polygon, it has three corners and
three sides”. Such cues, in fact, are necessary and sufficient for the definition of the concept
of triangle.
6There are, however, some proposals going in this direction. See e.g. [15].
7The heterogeneity problem is a multifaceted one since, as mentioned, it not only assumes
the existence of multiple representations but, for each of them, different kinds of categorization
and reasoning mechanisms and processes are assumed to exist and need to be integrated in
order to let intelligent behaviour emerge.
8There is an alternative perspective that sees CAs as the initial point of departure for the
subsequent autonomous development of a cognitive system (see [17]).
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eral structures without a general content. Thus, every evaluation of systems
relying upon them is necessarily task-specific and do not involve even the min-
imum part of the full spectrum of processes involved in human cognition when
the knowledge comes to play a role. In more practical terms this means that the
knowledge embedded in such architectures, and processed by artificial agents, is
usually built ad hoc, domain-specific, or based on the particular tasks they have
to deal with. Such limitation, however, affects the advancement in the cognitive
research concerning how humans heuristically select and deal with the huge and
varied amount of knowledge they possess when they have to make decisions,
reason about a given situation or, more generally, solve a particular cognitive
task involving several dimensions of analysis. This problem, as a consequence,
also limits the advancement of the research in the area of General Artificial
Intelligence. In the following we provide a short overview of some of the most
widely known and adopted CAs: SOAR [18], ACT-R [19], CLARION [20] and
LIDA [21] (in its novel version known as Vector-LIDA [22]). The choice of these
architectures has been based on the fact that they represent some of the most
widely used systems (adopted in scenarios ranging from robotics to videogames)
and their representational structures present some relevant differentiations that
are interesting to investigate in the light of the issues raised in this paper. By
analyzing, in brief, such architectures we will exclusively focus on the descrip-
tion of their representational frameworks since a more comprehensive review of
their whole mechanisms is out of the scope of the present contribution (detailed
reviews of their mechanisms are described in [23], [24], and [25]). We will show
how they are all affected, at different levels of granularity, by both the size and
the knowledge homogeneity problems 9.
9By analyzing the latter aspect we will not take into direct consideration the theory-like
representations introduced in the previous section, since the corresponding theory-theory ap-
proach is, to a certain extent, more vaguely defined when compared to both prototypes and
exemplar-based approaches. As a consequence, at present, its theoretical and computational
treatment seems to be more problematic. In addition we can take for granted that all the cur-
rently available architectures are able to learn some forms of ad-hoc micro-theories according
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3.1. SOAR
SOAR (see figure 1 below) is one of the most mature cognitive architec-
tures and has been used by many researchers worldwide during the last 30
years. This system was considered by Newell a candidate for a Unified Theory
of Cognition [5]. One of the main themes in SOAR is that all cognitive tasks
can be represented by problem spaces that are searched by production rules
grouped into operators. These production rules are fired in parallel to produce
reasoning cycles. From a representational perspective, SOAR exploits symbolic
representations of knowledge (called chunks) and use pattern matching to select
relevant knowledge elements. Basically, where a production match the contents
of declarative (working) memory the rule fires and then the content from the
declarative memory (called Semantic Memory in SOAR) is retrieved. This sys-
tem adheres strictly to Newell and Simon’s physical symbol system hypothesis
[26] which states that symbolic processing is a necessary and sufficient condition
for intelligent behavior.
With respect to the size and the heterogeneity problems, the SOAR knowl-
edge level is problematic for both aspects. SOAR agents, in fact, are not en-
dowed with general knowledge and only process ad-hoc built (or task-specific
learned) symbolic knowledge structures 10. Such type of knowledge structures,
in particular, are usually heavily used to perform standard logical reasoning and,
as a consequence, are strongly biased towards a “classical” conceptualisation of
knowledge in terms of necessary or sufficient conditions. In general, symbolic
to their interaction with the external environment. A general objection that can be raised
to all of them is, however, that they are not architecturally equipped with mechanisms able
to define the dynamics of the interaction between this kind of theory-like typical knowledge
and the other common-sense knowledge components (e.g. prototypes or exemplars). In addi-
tion, such theories are local, they have no generality and the current CAs are not designed to
provide any kind of interaction process able to couple different local and possibly contrasting
micro-theories.
10Despite this problem being acknowledged in [18] there is no available literature attesting
progress in this respect.
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Figure 1: The SOAR Cognitive Architecture. The semantic memory module of the archi-
tecture represents the information by using symbolic chunks (graph-like structures). The
representational assumption of the architecture is entirely symbolic.
representations strongly rely on the compositionality of meaning: where we can
distinguish between a set of primitive, or atomic, symbols and a set of com-
plex symbols. However, compositionality, despite being an important aspect
of human conceptual systems, is somewhat at odds with the representation of
concepts regarding typicality [27]. As a consequence of this representational
commitment, SOAR agents are not equipped with common-sense knowledge
components concerning, for example, prototypical or exemplar-based represen-
tations11. Therefore the system is not able to deal with prototype and exemplar-
11And this problem arises despite the fact that the chunks in SOAR can be represented as
a sort of frame-like structures containing some common-sense (e.g. prototypical) information.
In fact, the main problem of this architecture w.r.t. the heterogeneity assumption relies on
the fact that it does not specify how the typical knowledge components of a concept, and
the corresponding non monotonic-reasoning strategy, can interact with a possibly conflict-
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based categorization which, as described above, are two forms of common-sense
conceptual reasoning well established in human cognition and assumed to co-
exist in the heterogeneous perspective.
3.2. ACT-R
ACT-R (see figure 2 below) is a cognitive architecture explicitly inspired
by theories and experimental results coming from human cognition. Here the
cognitive mechanisms concerning the knowledge level emerge from the interac-
tion of two types of knowledge: declarative knowledge, which encodes explicit
facts that the system knows, and procedural knowledge, which encodes rules for
processing declarative knowledge. In particular, the declarative module is used
to store and retrieve pieces of information (called chunks, composed of a type
and a set of attribute-value pairs, similar to frame slots) in declarative memory.
ACT-R employs a subsymbolic activation of symbolic conceptual chunks repre-
senting the encoded knowledge. Finally, the central production system connects
these modules by using a set of IF-THEN production rules.
Differently from SOAR, ACT-R allows to represent the information in terms
of prototypes and exemplars and allow to perform, selectively, either prototype
or exemplar-based categorization. This means that the architecture allows the
modeller to manually specify which kind of categorization strategy to employ
according to his specific needs. Such an architecture, however, only partially
addresses the homogeneity problem since it does not allow to represent, jointly,
these different types of common-sense representations conveying different types
of information for the same conceptual entity (i.e. it does not assume a het-
erogeneous perspective). As a consequence, it is also not able to autonomously
ing representational and reasoning procedures characterizing other conceptualisation of the
same conceptual entity. In short it assumes, like most of the symbolic-oriented CAs, the
availability of a monolithic conceptual structure (e.g., a frame-like prototype or a “classical”
concept) without specifying how such information can be integrated and harmonized with
other knowledge components to form the whole knowledge spectrum characterizing a given
concept.
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Figure 2: The ACT-R Cognitive Architecture. The declarative memory module of the ar-
chitecture represent the information by using symbolic chunks (graph-like structures). The
representational assumption of the architecture is a combination of symbolic and subsymbolic.
decide which of the corresponding reasoning procedures to activate (e.g. proto-
types or exemplars) and to provide a framework able to manage the interaction
of such different reasoning strategies (however its overall architectural environ-
ment provides, at least in principle, the possibility of implementing cascade
reasoning processes triggering one another).
Even if some attempts exist concerning the design of harmonization strate-
gies between different types of common-sense conceptual categorizations (e.g.
exemplar-based and rule-based, see [28]) however they do not handle the prob-
lem concerning the interaction of the prototype or exemplar-based processes
according to the results coming from experimental cognitive science (for exam-
ple: the old item effect, privileging exemplars w.r.t. prototypes is not modeled.
See footnote 3 on this aspect.). Summing up: w.r.t. the heterogeneity prob-
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lem, the components needed to fully reconcile the Heterogeneity approach with
ACT-R are available, however they have not been fully exploited yet.
Regarding the size problem: as for SOAR, ACT-R agents are usually equipped
with task-specific knowledge and not with general cross-domain knowledge. In
this respect some relevant attempts to overcome this limitation have been re-
cently done by extending the Declarative Memory of the architecture. They will
be discussed in section 3.5 along with their current implications.
3.3. CLARION
CLARION is a hybrid cognitive architecture based on the dual-process the-
ory of mind. From a representational perspective, processes are mainly subject
to the activity of two sub-systems, the Action Centered Sub-system (ACS) and
the Non-Action Centered Sub-system (NACS). Both sub-systems store infor-
mation using a two-layered architecture, i.e., they both include an explicit and
an implicit level of representation. Each top-level chunk node is represented by
a set of (micro)features in the bottom level (i.e., a distributed representation).
The (micro)features (in the bottom level) are connected to the chunk nodes (in
the top level) so that they can be activated together through bottom-up or top-
down activation. Therefore, in general, a chunk is represented by both levels:
using a chunk node at the top level and distributed feature representation at
the bottom level.
W.r.t. to the size and the heterogeneity problems, CLARION encounters
problems with both levels since i) there are no available attempts aiming at
endowing such architecture with a general and cross-domain knowledge ii) the
dual-layered conceptual information does not provide the possibility of encoding
(manually or automatically via learning cycles) the information in terms of the
heterogeneous classes of representations presented in section 2. In particular,
the main problematic aspect concerns the representation of the common-sense
knowledge components. As for SOAR and ACT-R, in CLARION the possible
co-existence of typical representations in terms of prototypes, exemplars and
theories (and the interaction among them) is not treated. In terms of reasoning
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(e.g. indicating whether or not outcomes are satisfactory). The role of the
meta-cognitive subsystem is to monitor, direct, and modify the operations of the
action-centred subsystem dynamically as well as the operations of all the other
subsystems.
Each of these interacting subsystems consists of two levels of representation
(i.e. a dual representational structure). Generally, in each subsystem, the top level
encodes explicit knowledge and the bottom level encodes implicit knowledge.
The distinction between implicit and explicit has been amply discussed elsewhere
(Reber 1989, Stanley et al. 1989, Seger 1994, Cleeremans et al. 1998, Sun 2002).
The two levels interact, for example, by cooperating in actions through
a combination of the action recommendations from the two levels respectively,
as well as by cooperating in learning through a bottom-up and a top-down process
(to be discussed below). Essentially, it is a dual-process theory of mind (Chaiken and
Trope 1999); see figure 2.
It has been intended that this cognitive architecture satisfies some basic require-
ments as follows. It should be able to learn with or without a priori domain-specific
knowledge to begin with (Reber 1989, Sun et al. 2001). It also has to learn
continuously from on-going experience in the world. As indicated by Medin et al.
(1987), Nosofsky et al. (1994), and others, human learning is often gradual and
ongoing. As suggested by Reber (1989), Seger (1994), Anderson (1983), and others,
there are clearly diﬀerent types of knowledge involved in human learning
(e.g. procedural versus declarative, implicit versus explicit, or subconceptual versus
Reinforcement
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Figure 2. CLARION architecture: ACS, the action-centred subsystem; NACS, the non-
action-centred subsystem; MS, the motivational subsystem; MCS, the meta-cognitive
subsystem.
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Figure 3: The CLARION Cognitive Architecture (adapted from [20]).
strategies, notwithstanding that the implicit knowledge layer, based on neural
network representations, can provide forms of non-monotonic reasoning (e.g.,
based on similarity), such kind of similarity-based reasoning is currently not
grounded in the mechanisms guiding the decision choices followed, for example,
by prototype or exemplar-based reasoning.
3.4. Vector-LIDA
Vector-LIDA is novel version of the LIDA cognitive architecture (depicted
in figure 3) em loying, at the representational level, high- imensional vect rs
and reduced descriptions.
High-dimensional vec or spaces ha interesting propertie that make them
attractive for representations in cognitive models. The distribution of the dis-
tances between vectors these spaces, and the huge number of possible vectors,
14
Figure 4: The LIDA Cognitive Architecture. The novel version of the architecture employs
high-dimensional vector spaces to represent knowledge in its Declarative Memory module.
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allow noise-robust representations where the distance between vectors can be
used to measure the similarity (or dissimilarity) of the concepts they represent.
Moreover, these high-dimensional vectors can be used to represent complex
structures, where each vector denotes an element in the structure. However,
a single vector can also represent one of these same complex structures in its
entirety by implementing a reduced description, a mechanism to encode com-
plex hierarchical structures in vectors or connectionist models. These reduced
description vectors can be expanded to obtain the whole structure, and can be
used directly for complex calculations and procedures, such as making analo-
gies, logical inference, or structural comparison. Vectors in this framework
are treated as symbol-like representations, thus enabling different kind of op-
erations executed on them (e.g. simple forms of compositionality via vectors
blending). Vector-LIDA encounters the same limitations of the other CAs since
i) its agents are not equipped with a general cross-domain knowledge and there-
fore can be only used in very narrow tasks (their knowledge structure is either
built or learned ad hoc). Additionally, this architecture does not address the
problem concerning the heterogeneity of the knowledge typologies. In particular
its knowledge level does not represent the common-sense knowledge components
such as prototypes and exemplars (and the related reasoning strategies). In fact,
as for CLARION, despite vector representations allowing to perform many kind
of approximate comparisons and similarity-based reasoning (e.g., in tasks such
as categorization), the functionalities concerning prototype-based or exemplar-
based representations (along with the design of the interaction between their
different reasoning strategies) are not provided 12.
12In this respect, however an element that is worth-noting is represented by the fact that
the Vector-LIDA representational structures are very close to the framework of Conceptual
Spaces. Conceptual Spaces are a geometric knowledge representation framework proposed by
Peter Ga¨rdenfors. They can be thought as a particular class of vector representations where
knowledge is represented as a set of quality dimensions, and where a geometrical structure
is associated to each quality dimension. They are discussed in detail in section 5. The con-
vergence of the Vector-LIDA representation towards Conceptual Spaces could enable, in such
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3.5. Attempts to Overcome the Knowledge Limits
The problem concerning the limited knowledge availability for agents en-
dowed with cognitive architectures has been recently pointed out [16] and some
technical solutions for filling this knowledge gap have been proposed. In partic-
ular the use of ontologies and of semantic formalisms has been seen as a possible
solution for providing effective content to the structural knowledge modules of
the cognitive architectures. Some initial efforts have been done in this direction
13. In particular, within the ‘Mind’s Eye’ program (a 2010-2012 DARPA-funded
project), the knowledge layers of the ACT-R architecture have been semanti-
cally extended with external ontological content coming from three integrated
semantic resources composed of the lexical databases WordNet [29], FrameNet
[30] and by a branch of the top level ontology DOLCE [31] related to event
modeling. In this case, the amount of semantic knowledge selected for the real-
ization of the Cognitive Engine (one of the systems developed within the ‘Mind’s
Eye’ program) and for its evaluation, despite being far larger w.r.t. the stan-
dard ad-hoc solutions, was tailored to the specific needs of the system itself. In
fact, it was aimed at solving a precise task of event recognition through a video
analysis intelligent process; therefore only the ontological knowledge about the
events was selectively embedded in it. While this is a reasonable approach in an
applicative context, it still does not allow to test the general cognitive mecha-
nisms of a Cognitive Architecture on a general, multi-faceted and multi-domain,
knowledge. Therefore it does not allow to evaluate strictu sensu to what extent
the designed heuristics allowing to retrieve and process, from a massive and
composite knowledge base, conceptual knowledge can be considered satisfying
w.r.t. human performance.
architecture, the possibility of dealing with at least prototype and exemplars-based represen-
tations and reasoning, thus overcoming the knowledge homogeneity problem.
13It is worth noting that most of the attempts have been performed in ACT-R that seems
to be currently the available CA paying more attention to carefully constrain its knowledge
infrastructure to the insights coming from the results of experimental cognitive science w.r.t.
the representation and reasoning procedures operating at the knowledge level.
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More recent works have tried to completely overcome at least the size prob-
lem of the knowledge level. To this class of works belongs that one proposed by
Salvucci [32] aiming at enriching the knowledge model of the Declarative Mem-
ory of ACT-R with a world-level knowledge base such as DBpedia (i.e. the se-
mantic version of Wikipedia represented in terms of ontological formalisms) and
a previous one proposed in [33] presenting an integration of the ACT-R Declar-
ative and Procedural Memory with the Cyc ontology [34] (one of the widest on-
tological resources currently available containing more than 230,000 concepts).
Both wide-coverage integrated ontological resources, however, represent con-
ceptual information in terms of symbolic structures and encounter the standard
problems affecting this class of formalisms: i) they are not well equipped to
deal with common-sense knowledge representation and reasoning (since approx-
imate comparisons are hard and computationally intensive to implement with
graph-like representations), and ii) the typology of encoded knowledge is biased
towards the “classical” (but unsatisfactory) representation of concepts in terms
of necessary and sufficient conditions ([27]). In other terms, these ontology-
based systems, if considered in isolation, only allow de facto, to represent (and
reason on) one part of the whole spectrum of conceptual information14. On the
other hand, the so-called common-sense knowledge components (i.e., those that
allow to characterize and process conceptual information in terms of prototypes,
exemplars or theories and described above) are largely absent. Common-sense
conceptual knowledge, however, is exactly the type of cognitive information cru-
14In concrete applications, in fact, the information usually taken into account by adopting
ontological knowledge resources is that concerning the taxonomical relations between con-
cepts since it is based on necessary and sufficient conditions and allows to perform efficiently
forms of automatic monotonic reasoning. The remaining common-sense characterization of
concepts are not modeled since, despite in the field of logic-oriented KR various fuzzy and
non-monotonic extensions of DL formalisms have been designed to deal with such aspects [35],
various theoretical and practical problems remain unsolved and, in general, an acceptable KR
framework able to provide a practically usable trade-off regarding language expressivity and
complexity has not yet been achieved [27].
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cially used by humans for heuristic reasoning and decision making and therefore
represents a necessary aspect to be integrated in CAs aiming at providing an
explanatory role of some sort in the science of mind.
It is worth noting that, at least in principle, some of the described limi-
tations are intended to be overcome by the above-mentioned works, since the
integration of such wide-coverage ontological knowledge bases with the ACT-R
Declarative Memory allows to preserve the possibility of using the common-sense
conceptual processing mechanisms available in that architecture (e.g. prototype
and exemplars based categorization). Still, however, the main problem faced by
these external integrations remains: the lack of the representation of common-
sense information to which such common-sense architectural processes can be
applied. For instance, a conceptual retrieval based on prototypical traits (i.e.
a prototype-based categorization, see footnote 3) simply cannot be performed
on such integrated ontological knowledge bases if these symbolic systems do not
represent at all the typical information associated to a given concept (and, as we
will see in more detail in section 7, this phenomenon is largely majoritarian). In
addition, as mentioned in section 3.2, the problem concerning the interaction, in
a general and principled way, of the different types of common-sense processes
involving different representations of the same conceptual entity remains open.
In the light of the elements presented above it can be argued, therefore,
that the current proposed solutions for dealing with the knowledge problems in
CAs are not completely satisfactory. In particular, the integration with huge
world-level ontological knowledge bases can be considered a necessary solution
for solving the size problem. It is, however, insufficient for dealing with the
knowledge homogeneity problem and with the integration of the common-sense
conceptual mechanisms activated on heterogeneous bodies of knowledge, as as-
sumed in the heterogeneous representational perspective.
In the next sections we outline three possible alternative solutions that, de-
spite being not yet fully developed are, in perspective, suitable to account for
both for the heterogeneous aspects in conceptualization and for the size prob-
lems. In doing so we will outline how they share the same insights about the
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neural level of representation (adopted in most CAs because of its efficacy in
perceptual-based tasks). Namely, such approaches converge on the idea that the
problems affecting the knowledge level can be better addressed by focusing on
more abstract levels of representations w.r.t that available in neural networks.
In this perspective, the interesting aspect concerning neural representations con-
sists in the definition and development of transformation methods allowing to
pass from low-level representations to more abstract ones. As we will show,
some methods going in this direction already exist and have been successfully
employed in the area of computational cognitive science in systems aiming at
providing a reconciled and unified view of the theories of concepts based on
prototypes, exemplars, and theory-like structures.
4. Semantic Pointers
The Semantic Pointers approach is a representational perspective currently
investigated in the context of the biologically inspired SPAUN architecture [36].
A Semantic Pointers architecture sees concepts as symbol-like vectorial represen-
tations that result from different kinds of transformation processes of low-level
neural representations in further high-level representations that function to sup-
port cognitive processes like categorization, inference, and language use. The
core idea behind this approach is that the activity of a population of neurons
at any given time can be interpreted as representing a vector.
The SPAUN architecture, assuming this perspective, has been successfully
used to replicate three paradigmatic categorization studies concerning prototype-
based categorization, exemplar-based categorization and theory-theory based
categorization [37]. Such results show that the provided representational ap-
proach can account for different kinds of categorization processes assumed in
the heterogeneous perspective. However, it is agnostic w.r.t. how such pro-
cesses interact with each other in the case of multiple available representations
for the same conceptual entity. From the size perspective, on the other hand,
this approach has been currently exploited for representing the human-sized
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lexical knowledge structured in the Wordnet taxonomy in terms of biologically
plausible and scalable neural network representations [38].
In this approach, the interpretation of neural representations as vectors is
obtained through different kind of transformation operations, namely: circular
convolution, vector addition and involution [38]. In the circular convolution op-
eration two input neural populations, each representing a vector, are connected
to an intermediary population that projects to an output population a vector
that is the convolution of the two input vectors. The Vector addition operation
plays, on the other hand, the role of a superposition operator. In particular,
it allows multiple bindings to be stored in a single vector. Finally, the vec-
tor involution operation is an approximate inverse with respect to the circular
convolution. As reported by the authors ’the circular convolution, vector ad-
dition, and involution operations can be thought of as vector analogs of the
familiar algebraic operations of multiplication, addition, and taking the recip-
rocal, respectively’ [38]. In this sense, the Semantic Pointer perspective seems
to provide an effective set of operational tools to proceed from a lower level of
representation to another, more abstract, one.
Summing up: concerning the size problem, as mentioned, this approach has
proven to be usable to neurally represent human-level lexical knowledge. On
the other hand, i.e. w.r.t. the heterogeneity problem, it represents a more
powerful, but still incomplete, account of the common-sense typicality-based
processes executable on conceptual representations. In particular, the frame-
work has been proven able to replicate the full spectrum of typicality effects
studied in human cognition including (and differently from the other propos-
als reviewed) the theory-theory approach 15. However it still does not provide
15In this respect it is worth noting that the methods employed by the Semantic Pointers Ar-
chitecture to provide an abstract interpretation of neural mechanisms and representation are
completely compatible (and integrable) with some mechanisms provided by cognitive archi-
tectures dealing with the neural representations. For example: they can be easily reproduced
within the subsymbolic activation mechanisms of a cognitive architecture such as ACT-R.
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any account concerning the dynamics of interaction and harmonization of the
plethora of processes involving the conceptual representations assumed to co-
exist according to the heterogeneous hypothesis. Therefore, in this sense, the
same objection raised for the current state of development of the knowledge
level of the standard CAs remains unanswered. As a consequence, the explana-
tory power of the Semantic Pointer Architecture w.r.t. the cognitive theories
and the experimental results that it is able to replicate is currently very lim-
ited (since the replication of such categorization experiments did not lead to
any kind of additional explanation of these, already known, phenomena). This
aspect represents a symptom that, in order to account for the interaction of the
heterogeneous mechanisms operating over different, but interlinked, represen-
tations the focus on the neural level is, in some sense, unnecessary and can be
switched to other classes of representations having the advantage of being less
opaque.
5. Conceptual Spaces as Intermediate Level
Conceptual Spaces [39] have been proposed by Peter Ga¨rdenfors as an in-
termediate level of representation between the subsymbolic and symbolic lev-
els. It has been argued that the integration of this level enables to overcome
some classical problems specifically related to the subsymbolic and symbolic
representations considered in isolation [40]. Conceptual Spaces are a geomet-
rical framework for the representation of knowledge16 and can be thought as
a metric space in which entities are characterized by quality dimensions [39].
To each quality dimension is associated a geometrical (topological or metrical)
structure. In some cases, such dimensions can be directly related to perceptual
mechanisms; examples of this kind are temperature, weight, brightness, pitch.
In other cases, dimensions can be more abstract in nature. In this setting,
16In the last fifteen years, such framework has been employed in a vast range of AI appli-
cations spanning from visual perception [41] to robotics [42], from question answering [43] to
music perception [44] (see [45] for a recent overview).
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concepts correspond to convex regions, and regions with different geometrical
properties correspond to different sorts of concepts [39]. Here, prototypes and
prototypical reasoning have a natural geometrical interpretation: prototypes
correspond to the geometrical center of a convex region (the centroid). Also
exemplar-based representation can be represented as points in a multidimen-
sional space, and their similarity can be computed as the intervening distance
between two points, based on some suitable metrics (such as Euclidean and
Manhattan distance etc.).
Recently some available conceptual categorization systems, explicitly as-
suming the heterogeneous representational hypothesis and coupling Conceptual
Spaces representations and ontological knowledge bases, have been developed.
For our purposes, we will consider here the DUAL PECCS system [46]: that
system has been integrated with available CAs by explicitly designing the flow of
interaction between the common-sense, non-monotonic, categorization strategies
(based on prototypes and exemplars and operating on conceptual spaces repre-
sentations) and the standard deductive processes (operating on the ontological
conceptual component). The harmonization regarding such different classes of
mechanisms has been devised based on the tenets coming from the dual process
theory of reasoning (see section 7). Additionally, in this system, the flow of
interaction occurring within the class of non monotonic categorization mecha-
nisms (i.e. prototypes and exemplar-based categorization) has been devised and
is dealt with at the Conceptual Spaces level. This latter aspect is of particu-
lar interest in light of the problem concerning the heterogeneity of the encoded
knowledge. In fact, since the design of the interaction of the different processes
operating with heterogeneous representations still represents a largely ignored
problem in current CAs, this system shows that Conceptual Spaces represent
a relatively effortless framework to model the dynamics between prototype and
exemplar-based processes.
Concerning the size problem, the possible grounding of the Conceptual
Spaces representational framework with symbolic structures enables the integra-
tion with wide-coverage knowledge bases such CYC (as provided, for example,
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in DUAL PECCS [46]), DBpedia or similar.
An additional element of interest concerning the advantages provided by in-
troducing the adoption of Conceptual Spaces as intermediate representational
level in CAs regards its capability to address a classical problem in formal con-
ceptualization: namely the problem of reconciling compositionally and typicality
effects (for more details on this issue we remind to [47]) 17. This aspect does
not affect, per se, the size problem but the problem concerning the knowledge
heterogeneity (since it assumes the existence of typicality-based representations)
and has been shown to be problematic for symbolic/logic-oriented approaches
[49]) as well as, according to the well-known argument by Fodor and Phylishin
[50], for classical connectionist approaches. On the other hand this aspect can
be formally handled by recurring to Conceptual Spaces (as shown in [47, 51]).
Interestingly enough, this problem can also be treated by the Semantic Pointers
perspective (once, in this framework, the more abstract level of representation
is reached through the transformation operations mentioned above). The simi-
larity between the two approaches is another indirect suggestion that the neural
level of representation, per se, can be considered not directly necessary to deal
with the problematic aspects affecting the conceptual representation and pro-
cessing capabilities in CAs.
17Broadly speaking this aspect regards the problem of dealing, in a coherent way, with the
compositionality of prototypical representations. According to a well-known argument ([48];
[49]), prototypes are not compositional. In brief, the argument runs as follows: consider a
concept like pet fish. It results from the composition of the concept pet and the concept fish.
However, the prototype of pet fish cannot result from the composition of the prototypes of
a pet and a fish: a typical pet is furry and warm, a typical fish is grayish, but a typical
pet fish is neither furry and warm nor grayish. The possibility of explaining, in a coherent
way, this type of combinatorial and generative phenomenon highlights a crucial aspect of the
conceptual processing capabilities in human cognition and concerns some crucial high-level
cognitive abilities such as that ones concerning conceptual composition, metaphor generation
and creative thinking. Dealing with this problem requires the harmonization of two conflicting
requirements in representational systems: the need of syntactic, generative, compositionality
(typical of logical systems) and that one concerning the exhibition of typicality effects.
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Summing up: endowing CAs with Conceptual Spaces seems, in principle,
a promising way to deal with both the size and the heterogeneity problems of
conceptual representations. There is, however, still an open problem to explicitly
face for such approach. In particular, concerning the size issue, there is still a
lack of knowledge bases encoded in terms of Conceptual Spaces comparable with
the sizes of the ontological KB. Some initial attempts to automatically learn
and encode wide-coverage Conceptual Spaces knowledge bases by starting by
linguistic resources such as BabelNet18 and ConceptNet19 have been developed
[52, 53], but still there is a huge gap to cover and this aspect requires further
investigations.
6. Neural-Symbolic Integrations and Extended Declarative Memories
As mentioned in section 3.5. different efforts have been attempted to implic-
itly address the size and the knowledge heterogeneity problems in CAs. Notably
such efforts, that share the same limitations and possibilities as the others, have
been developed within an architecture such as ACT-R that presents a hybrid
approach to conceptual representation and reasoning combining subsymbolic-
based activation mechanisms, operating on classical symbolic structures, and
rule-based representational structures (see section 3.2). Since the current state
of the art and the possible future developments of ACT-R have already been
discussed in section 3.5, we focus here on showing how its underlying assump-
tions are compliant with both the Semantic Pointers Perspective, and with the
approach claiming the advantages that an intermediate Conceptual Spaces rep-
resentation connecting subsymbolic and symbolic levels would provide. With
respect to the first approach, in particular, it has been showed how the in-
tegration of ACT-R with a connectionist architecture allows to learn without
supervision associations in object recognition between percepts and categorical
labels. [54]. The way in which such elements are integrated is fully compliant
18http://babelnet.org/
19http://conceptnet5.media.mit.edu/
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with the Semantic Pointer perspective and is based on the shared assumption
that leveraging and abstracting more high-level forms of representation is a key
element to produce advances that cannot be achieved by operating exclusively
at the neural level. With respect to the Conceptual spaces approach, on the
other hand, the neuro-symbolic integration allows to deal with the classical
problem concerning the need for reconciling compositionally and typicality ef-
fects in conceptualization. The approach developed in ACT-R, in fact, belongs
to the class of so-called neo-connectionist approaches that, unlike the classical
connectionist systems, are able to deal with limited forms of compositionality
in neural networks (see [55] on this point).
Interestingly enough, there are also attempts that have shown how the neuro-
symbolic approach adopted by ACT-R can be used as an intermediate functional
level in a complex system combining different Cognitive Architectures, such as
SODAS [56] and SOAR, that can perform different cognitive tasks (e.g. the
high level symbolic and knowledge-drive reasoning in SOAR and the low-level
perceptual one to SODAS) that are more naturally dealt with in different envi-
ronments [57]. This idea is somehow similar to that of using Conceptual Spaces
as an intermediate level of representation: from a knowledge processing per-
spective, the types of tasks that such hybrid architecture is able to account are
essentially the same.
ACT-R can also generalize over perceptual transductions by applying fine-
grained models of the world to concrete scenarios. As already discussed, in
order to fulfill this goal, ACT-R needs to properly encapsulate those models –
or ontologies – and exploit them for pattern recognition and high-level reason-
ing. Since the ACT-R declarative module supports a relatively coarse-grained
semantics based on slot-value pairs, and the procedural system is not optimal
to effectively manage complex logical constructs (e.g., 2nd order), specific exten-
sions have been designed to make ACT-R suitable to fulfill knowledge-intensive
tasks. Accordingly, the work outlined in [16] proposed an expansion of ACT-R
with SCONE [58]. SCONE is an open-source knowledge-base system intended
for use as a component in many different software applications: it provides a
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LISP-based framework to represent and reason over symbolic common sense
knowledge. Unlike most diffuse KB systems (e.g. ontologies), SCONE is not
based on Description Logics [59]: its inference engine adopts marker-passing
algorithms [58] (originally designed for massive parallel computing) to perform
fast queries at the cost of losing logical completeness and decidability. In par-
ticular, SCONE represents knowledge as a semantic network whose nodes are
locally weighted (marked) and associated to arcs (wires20) in order to optimize
basic reasoning tasks (e.g. class membership, transitivity, inheritance of proper-
ties, etc). The philosophy that inspired SCONE is straightforward: from vision
to speech, humans exploit the brain’s massive parallelism to fulfill all recognition
tasks; similarly, if we want to build a general AI system that is able to deal with
the large amount of knowledge required in common-sense reasoning, we need
to rely on a mechanism that is fast and effective enough to simulate parallel
search. Shortcomings are not an issue since humans are not perfect inference
engines either. Accordingly, SCONE implementation of marker-passing algo-
rithms aims at simulating a pseudo-parallel search by assigning specific marker
bits to each knowledge unit. For example, if we query a KB to get all the
parts of cars, SCONE would assign a marker M1 to the A-node car and search
for all the statements in the knowledge base where M1 is the A-wire (domain)
of the relation part-of, returning all the classes in the range of the relation
(also called ‘B-nodes’). SCONE would finally assign the marker bit M2 to all
B-nodes, also retrieving all the inherited subclasses21. The modularization and
implementation of an ontology with SCONE allows for an effective formal rep-
resentation and inferencing of core ontological properties of world entities. Note
that the integration of SCONE into ACT-R respects the requirements of the cog-
nitive architecture, especially in terms of limited-capacity buffers constraining
the communication between a dedicated SCONE module and ACT-R’s default
20In general, a wire can be conceived as a binary relation whose domain and range are
referred to, respectively, as A-node and B-node.
21We refer the reader to [58] for details concerning marker-passing algorithms.
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modules. Also, the SCONE marker-passing algorithms are comparable to ACT-
R spreading activation, leaving open the possibility of a deeper integration of
the two frameworks in future work. The integration of ACT-R with SCONE
represents, in other words, a suitable way to connect architectural mechanisms
to a symbolic knowledge base. With respect to the external extensions provided
with wide-coverage KBs (and discussed in section 3.5), however, such approach
still needs to face the problem concerning the size aspect (since the SCONE KBs
are not comparable with Cyc or DBpedia). Concerning the heterogeneity prob-
lem, on the other hand, such integration seems to provide a straightforward way
to combine common-sense reasoning operating with symbolic knowledge struc-
tures. Still, however, the problem concerning the integration of heterogeneous
processes acting on different bodies of knowledge is not addressed.
Summing up: all the approaches presented in the sections 4, 5 and 6 can be
seen as alternative – and yet compliant – solutions in order to develop a more
comprehensive (and constrained to human cognition) account of conceptual rep-
resentation and processing mechanism in Cognitive Architectures.
A further axis that we will consider as an element for dealing with the het-
erogeneity issues, in the context of CAs endowed with wide-coverage knowledge
bases, is represented by the so-called dual process hypothesis of reasoning and
rationality. This aspect will be considered in the next section.
7. A Dual Process Approach for the Heterogeneous Integration of
Cognitive Mechanisms
The approaches presented in the previous sections converge on the insight
that designing the interaction (and integration) of the heterogeneous processes
operating with different representations (i.e. the heterogeneity problem) can be
made more effective by operating at more abstract levels of representation than
the one proposed by connectionist representations.
In our opinion an additional element that is worth considering to determine,
at the architectural level, the interaction strategies between different types of
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mechanisms operating on heterogeneous representations corresponds to the dual
process hypothesis of reasoning and rationality. According to dual process theo-
ries ([60], [61], [62]) two different types of cognitive processes and systems exist,
which have been called respectively System(s) 1 and System(s) 2.
System 1 processes are automatic. They are phylogenetically older and
shared by humans and other animal species. They are innate and control in-
stinctive behaviors, so they do not depend on training or particular individual
abilities and, in general, they are cognitively undemanding. They are associa-
tive and operate in a parallel and fast way. Moreover, System 1 processes are
not consciously accessible to the subject.
System 2 processes are phylogenetically recent and are peculiar to the human
species. They are conscious and cognitively penetrable (i.e. accessible to con-
sciousness) and based on explicit rule following. As a consequence, if compared
to System 1, System 2 processes are sequential and slower, and cognitively de-
manding. Performances that depend on System 2 processes are usually affected
by acquired skills and differences in individual capabilities.
The dual process approach was initially proposed to account for systematic
errors in reasoning. Such errors (consider, e.g., the classical examples of the
selection task or the conjunction fallacy) should be ascribed to fast, associative
and automatic type 1 processes, while type 2 is responsible for the slow and
cognitively demanding activity of producing answers that are correct concerning
the canons of normative rationality.
In general, many aspects concerning the psychology of concepts have pre-
sumably to do with fast, type 1 system and processes, while others can be
plausibly ascribed to type 2. In particular, the ability to make explicit, high-
level inferences involving conceptual knowledge, and capacity to justify them,
can be considered as a type 2 process while the common-sense mechanisms op-
erating with typical representations (e.g. prototype, exemplars or theory-based
categorization) can be considered type 1 processes.
A possible way to evaluate the importance of dual process strategies in
knowledge processing can be provided by testing to what extent an AI sys-
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tem designed with this perspective and endowed with a common knowledge base
“has the methods for making obvious inferences from this knowledge” [63]. Such
common-sense based evaluation task is known to be one of the grand challenges
of AI and Cognitive Modeling in general [64]. In so doing we can account for
the importance of the dual process approach by analyzing the results obtained
by the system by executing S1 or S2 processes alone or in combination.
By following the general suggestions presented in [65] we tested the DUAL-
PECCS categorization system (see section 5), integrated with the ACT-R mech-
anisms, in a conceptual categorization task very similar to the psychological test
known as “Word Reasoning” 22. For human subjects, the Word Reasoning task
consists in identifying a concept based on one to three clues. The participant
might be told ‘You can see through it’ as a first clue; ‘It is square and you
can open it’, and so on. The processing required by a Word Reasoning item
goes beyond retrieval because the participant has to integrate the clues and
choose among alternative hypotheses. Unfortunately, as reported by [65], the
standard specific questions provided for this task in the Wechsler Preschool and
Primary Scale of Intelligence are proprietary. Nonetheless, the general structure
of each sentence is public. For this purpose we have therefore re-used a dataset
composed of 112 linguistic descriptions (corresponding to very simple riddles)
designed by a team of linguists and neuroscientist in the frame of a research
project investigating neural correlates of lexical processing and already used for
previous comparisons between humans and systems performances 23 [43].
Such descriptions exhibit a structure similar to that of the Word Reasoning
task: on average, no more than 3 cues are present in each riddle. An example
of such descriptions is “The mice hunter with whiskers and long tail”, where
22For this experiment the system relies on a Conceptual Spaces KB of 300 concepts, exe-
cuting S1 processes, integrated with the corresponding classes in the Open Cyc ontology via
Wordnet IDs (see [46] for the details abut the integration). The S2 processes are operated
on the ontological knowledge base and work as control mechanism w.r.t. the categorization
results provided by type 1 processes which are non-monotonic in nature.
23The full list of descriptions is publicly available at: http://goo.gl/EYJozw.
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the expected category to be retrieved was cat, and in particular its representa-
tion corresponding to the “prototype of cat”; conversely, a description such as
“The feline mice hunter without fur” was expected to lead to the answer of “ex-
emplar of canadian-sphynx”. The expected categorical targets represent a gold
standard, since they correspond to the results provided by 30 human subjects in
a psychological experimentation and already described and presented elsewhere
[66, 46].
For such descriptions we have recorded the categorization capabilities of the
system by analyzing: i) when the expected categorical target is obtained by
S1 processes in isolation ii) which role is played by the S2 types of processes
iii) whether the S2 types of processes considered in isolation would have been
able to provide the same, or better, results w.r.t. the S1 processes considered
in isolation. The test of the effectiveness of S2 types of processes in isolation
(the third condition mentioned above) has been executed by querying large
ontological knowledge bases such as Cyc [34] and DBpedia. The differences
between the two systems are reported as well. For querying both Cyc and
DBpedia we have manually extracted the information from the text and have
transformed then in SPARQL queries. For example: the description ”A big,
black and white sea bird that swims and cannot fly” corresponds to the following
SPARQL query in DBpedia (provided here with a N3 notation to favour the
readability) 24
SELECT DISTINCT ? animal
WHERE {? animal
dbpedia−owl : c l a s s dbpedia : Bird ;
dcterms : s u b j e c t ? s1 ;
dcterms : s u b j e c t ? s2 .
? page dbpedia−owl : fami ly ? animal .
24The complete list of queries is available: https://goo.gl/fnwwqO.
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FILTER( conta in s ( b i f : lower ( s t r (? page ) ) , ” white ”)
| | conta in s ( b i f : lower ( s t r (? page ) ) , ” b lack ” ) ) .
FILTER( conta in s ( b i f : lower ( s t r (? s1 ) ) , ” f l y ”)
| | conta in s ( b i f : lower ( s t r (? s1 ) ) , ” f l i g h t ”)
&& conta in s ( b i f : lower ( s t r (? s1 ) ) , ” l e s s ” ) ) .
FILTER( conta in s ( b i f : lower ( s t r (? s2 ) ) , ” sea ” ) ) .
Table 1: Experimental results assessing the usefulness of the S1-S2 integration processes in
a categorisation task w.r.t. the S1 or S2 processes considered in isolation.
Cases where S2 confirmed the category returned by S1 99.0% (111/112)
Cases where S1 (alone) returned the expected category 77.7% (87/112)
Cases where S2 (Cyc) alone returned the expected category 1.6% (2/112)
Cases where S2 (DBpedia) alone returned the expected category 2.7% (3/112)
The results obtained by this experimentation are reported in table 1 25.
7.1. Discussion
An interesting aspect revealed by this analysis is that the tested DUAL-
PECCS system (explicitly based on both a heterogeneous representational hy-
pothesis and on the dual process assumption) is able to categorize, thanks to
the S1 component, stimuli with typical, though ontologically incoherent, de-
scriptions. An example of such a case is the result obtained for the stimulus
“The big fish that eats plankton”. In this case the expected prototypical an-
swer is whale. However, whales are mammals, not fishes. In the adopted system,
the S1 component returns the “whale” answer by resorting to the prototypical
25The results for the S1 categorization performance cover the full pipeline of the DUAL-
PECCS system including the information extraction step from the natural language. Therefore
some errors are due to the difficulty of this step. Without IE step the performance of the S1
system increase to the 89.3%.
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knowledge. However, when the output of S1 is then checked with S2 processes
against the Open Cyc ontology (the symbolic KB used in DUAL-PECCS), an
inconsistency is detected and explained as follows:
subClassOf ( ( cetacean ) , ( p l a c e n t a l mammal) )
subClassOf ( (mammal) , (warm−blooded animal ) )
subClassOf ( ( newClass ) , ( whale ) )
type ( newIndiv , ( newClass ) )
subClassOf ( ( newClass ) , ( f i s h ) )
d i s j o in tWith ( (warm−blooded animal ) , ( cold−blooded animal ) )
subClassOf ( ( f i s h ) , ( cold−blooded animal ) )
subClassOf ( ( p l a c e n t a l mammal) , (mammal) )
subClassOf ( ( whale ) , ( cetacean ) )
Laconic Explanation : Class ( whale ) i s not ( cold−blooded animal )
but i s (warm−blooded animal )
As shown in the example above, the S2 processes activated by the ontological
component provides the whole logical path leading to the inconsistency of the
S1 result (it also provides a summary of the complete explanation, a laconic
explanation that is easier to read and understand for human users). Due to
the detected inconsistency, the first result of S1 is withdrawn and the next best
result provided by S1 is tested 26. This example shows in which cases the cycle
of interaction between S1 and S2 processes can lead to revised and interesting
conclusions.
An additional datum coming out of this evaluation is that S1 mostly pro-
vided an output coherent with the model in the S2 component (there is only
one case, i.e. the one described above, where the S2 component corrects the
26In this case, the final output of the categorization system is a pair obtained by the first,
fast and typical, S1 result and the second, slow and S2 compliant one. The details about the
categorization algorithm and the termination conditions are in [46]
33
output of S1). This datum is of interest in that, although it is postulated that
the reasoning check performed by S2 is beneficial to ensure a refinement of the
categorization process, in this experimentation S2 did not reveal any significant
improvement to the output provided by S1. This is, on the other hand, in line
with the assumption that most of the common-sense answers can be success-
fully addressed, in the heterogeneous perspective, by the typical representational
components adopting S1 processes. In addition, this datum can be additionally
explained by considering the fact that the adopted dataset contains, as above
mentioned, exclusively common-sense linguistic descriptions to be categorized.
In cases of datasets with a different type of descriptions and involving, for ex-
ample, the categorization of items based on necessary and sufficient condition
(e.g., as happens in the mathematical domain) our prediction is that the S2
processes operating on the classical ontological representations could categorize
very well the correct answer since, in this case, the activated reasoning process
would correspond to a very simple and classical form of deductive categorization
that has a different nature w.r.t. the S1 processes.
Finally, the current analysis showed that the S2 knowledge components (con-
sidered in isolation) are not able, de facto, to provide answers to most of the
provided common-sense queries. The completely inadequate, or absent, answers
provided by the tested large-scale ontological systems (Cyc and DBpedia) is a
result compatible with the problems mentioned in section 3.5 and affecting this
class of ontological structures (namely the fact that, due to the Tarskian-like
semantics assumed by the underlying formalisms, the representation of common-
sense information is largely absent in such knowledge bases). In other words,
this is a symptom of the fact that such representational frameworks need to be
integrated with other frameworks in order to be able to represent and reason on
common-sense information. In general, the results obtained by this preliminary
analysis suggests that, for common-sense reasoning and retrieval, the improve-
ment provided by the adoption of the S2 mechanisms operating on classical
symbolic structures is very limited.
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However, it is also clear that it is not possible to explain the entire cognition
of a cognitive agent exclusively in terms of S1 processes. Therefore, given the
importance of the dual process approach in explaining how to harmonize and
integrate different kind of reasoning processes assumed to co-exist in a hetero-
geneous representational perspective, additional investigations are needed.
In particular, in our opinion, such analyses should investigate: i) in which
cases the S2 processes play a more relevant role w.r.t. the one proposed here
ii) in which cases the S2 processes are not at all evoked by a cognitive system,
since the need to react in real time is more pressing. Since there is not a
clear answer to such questions, such aspects will involve, in our opinion, the
future research agenda of both the cognitive psychology and cognitive (artificial)
systems research.
8. Conclusions
In this paper we identified and characterized two main aspects concerning
the knowledge level of the current CAs, namely the size and the homogeneous
typology of the encoded knowledge. We have argued that, on the basis of the
results coming from the experimental research in cognitive science, such aspects
need to be addressed in order to structurally bind the knowledge level of the
Cognitive Architectures to the constraints and challenges faced by human cog-
nition in everyday knowledge processing tasks. Additionally, we have argued
that these issues represent, from a technological perspective, a crucial challenge
to address in order to be able to build cognitive agents able to operate and
make decisions in general scenarios by exploiting a plethora of integrated rea-
soning mechanisms. Based on these assumptions we have provided an analysis
of the most relevant CAs in the state of the art: we showed how all of them
encounter, at different levels of granularity, some problems in dealing, jointly,
with the above mentioned aspects. In the final part of the paper we have pre-
sented three different, but compatible, approaches that converge on the insight
that, in order to address the problems affecting the knowledge level in CAs, the
35
focus of attention should be posed on a more abstract level of representation
w.r.t. the one addressed by neural representations (the analyzed approaches
are: the Semantic Pointers approach; the approach based on Conceptual Spaces
as intermediate representational level; and the novel Neuro-Symbolic Approach
embedded in ACT-R).
Finally, since a crucial problem in the heterogeneous representational per-
spective is represented by the harmonization of different kinds reasoning pro-
cesses, we have preliminarily investigated the usefulness of the dual process
approach of reasoning by analyzing the results obtained by the DUAL-PECCS
system in a categorization tasks. The obtained results suggest that, while the
general heuristic provided by the dual approach represents a suitable way to
integrate different reasoning mechanisms, it is still not clear (from a theoretical
or an applicative point of view) if both dual process mechanisms are always
activated. Therefore it is still an open question as to whether the hypothesized
dual processes are worth considering as a general architectural mechanism (and,
as such, worth implementing in the CAs processes operating on the conceptual
structures of a cognitive agent) or as a local mechanism, activated under cer-
tain circumstances. As mentioned above, an answer to this question will require
a joint investigation effort by both the cognitive psychology and the cognitive
modeling community.
9. References
[1] G. Gigerenzer, P. M. Todd, Simple heuristics that make us smart, Oxford
University Press, USA, 1999.
[2] H. A. Simon, A behavioral model of rational choice, The quarterly journal
of economics (1955) 99–118.
[3] A. Newell, Physical symbol systems, Cognitive science 4 (2) (1980) 135–183.
[4] A. Newell, The knowledge level, Artificial intelligence 18 (1) (1982) 87–127.
[5] A. Newell, Unified theories of cognition, Harvard University Press, 1994.
36
[6] R. Cordeschi, The discovery of the artificial: Behavior, mind and machines
before and beyond cybernetics, Vol. 28, Springer Science & Business Media,
2002.
[7] M. Mi lkowski, Explaining the computational mind, Mit Press, 2013.
[8] A. Lieto, D. P. Radicioni, From human to artificial cognition and back:
New perspectives on cognitively inspired ai systems, Cognitive Systems
Research 39 (2016) 1–3.
[9] H. Putnam, Minds and machines, MacMillan, 1960.
[10] E. Rosch, Cognitive representations of semantic categories, J. Exp. Psychol.
Gen. 104 (3) (1975) 192–233.
[11] G. L. Murphy, The big book of concepts, MIT press, 2002.
[12] E. Machery, Doing without concepts, OUP, 2009.
[13] B. C. Malt, An on-line investigation of prototype and exemplar strategies
in classification., Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory,
and Cognition 15 (4) (1989) 539.
[14] M. Frixione, A. Lieto, Representing non classical concepts in formal on-
tologies: Prototypes and exemplars, in: New challenges in distributed in-
formation filtering and retrieval, Springer, 2013, pp. 171–182.
[15] A. Lieto, A computational framework for concept representation in cog-
nitive systems and architectures: Concepts as heterogeneous proxytypes,
Procedia Computer Science 41 (2014) 6–14.
[16] A. Oltramari, C. Lebiere, Pursuing artificial general intelligence by lever-
aging the knowledge capabilities of act-r, in: Artificial General Intelligence,
Springer, 2012, pp. 199–208.
[17] D. Vernon, Artificial cognitive systems: A primer, MIT Press, 2014.
[18] J. Laird, The Soar cognitive architecture, MIT Press, 2012.
37
[19] J. R. Anderson, D. Bothell, M. D. Byrne, S. Douglass, C. Lebiere, Y. Qin,
An integrated theory of the mind., Psychological review 111 (4) (2004)
1036.
[20] R. Sun, The CLARION cognitive architecture: Extending cognitive mod-
eling to social simulation, Cognition and multi-agent interaction (2006)
79–99.
[21] S. Franklin, F. Patterson Jr, The lida architecture: Adding new modes
of learning to an intelligent, autonomous, software agent, pat 703 (2006)
764–1004.
[22] J. Snaider, S. Franklin, Vector lida, Procedia Computer Science 41 (2014)
188–203.
[23] D. Vernon, G. Metta, G. Sandini, A survey of artificial cognitive systems:
Implications for the autonomous development of mental capabilities in com-
putational agents, IEEE Transactions on Evolutionary Computation 11 (2)
(2007) 151.
[24] P. Langley, J. E. Laird, S. Rogers, Cognitive architectures: Research issues
and challenges, Cognitive Systems Research 10 (2) (2009) 141–160.
[25] K. Tho´risson, H. Helgasson, Cognitive architectures and autonomy: A com-
parative review, Journal of Artificial General Intelligence 3 (2) (2012) 1–30.
[26] A. Newell, H. A. Simon, Computer science as empirical inquiry: Symbols
and search, Communications of the ACM 19 (3) (1976) 113–126.
[27] M. Frixione, A. Lieto, Representing concepts in formal ontologies: Compo-
sitionality vs. typicality effects, Logic and Logical Philosophy 21 (4) (2012)
391–414.
[28] J. R. Anderson, J. Betz, A hybrid model of categorization, Psychonomic
Bulletin & Review 8 (4) (2001) 629–647.
38
[29] G. A. Miller, Wordnet: a lexical database for english, Communications of
the ACM 38 (11) (1995) 39–41.
[30] C. F. Baker, C. J. Fillmore, J. B. Lowe, The berkeley framenet project,
in: Proceedings of the 17th international conference on Computational
linguistics-Volume 1, Association for Computational Linguistics, 1998, pp.
86–90.
[31] C. Masolo, S. Borgo, A. Gangemi, N. Guarino, A. Oltramari, Wonderweb
deliverable d18, ontology library (final), ICT project 33052.
[32] D. D. Salvucci, Endowing a cognitive architecture with world knowledge,
in: Procs. of the 36th Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society,
2014.
[33] J. Ball, S. Rodgers, K. Gluck, Integrating act-r and cyc in a large-scale
model of language comprehension for use in intelligent agents, in: AAAI
workshop, 2004, pp. 19–25.
[34] D. B. Lenat, Cyc: A large-scale investment in knowledge infrastructure,
Communications of the ACM 38 (11) (1995) 33–38.
[35] L. Giordano, V. Gliozzi, N. Olivetti, G. L. Pozzato, A non-monotonic
description logic for reasoning about typicality, Artificial Intelligence 195
(2013) 165–202.
[36] C. Eliasmith, T. C. Stewart, X. Choo, T. Bekolay, T. DeWolf, Y. Tang,
D. Rasmussen, A large-scale model of the functioning brain, Science
338 (6111) (2012) 1202–1205.
[37] P. Blouw, E. Solodkin, P. Thagard, C. Eliasmith, Concepts as semantic
pointers: a framework and computational model, Cognitive science.
[38] E. Crawford, M. Gingerich, C. Eliasmith, Biologically plausible, human-
scale knowledge representation, Cognitive science.
39
[39] P. Ga¨rdenfors, Conceptual spaces: The geometry of thought, MIT press,
2000.
[40] P. Ga¨rdenfors, Symbolic, conceptual and subconceptual representations,
in: Human and Machine Perception, Springer, 1997, pp. 255–270.
[41] A. Chella, M. Frixione, S. Gaglio, A cognitive architecture for artificial
vision, Artificial Intelligence 89 (1) (1997) 73–111.
[42] A. Chella, M. Frixione, S. Gaglio, Anchoring symbols to conceptual spaces:
the case of dynamic scenarios, Robotics and Autonomous Systems 43 (2)
(2003) 175–188.
[43] A. Lieto, D. P. Radicioni, V. Rho, A common-sense conceptual categoriza-
tion system integrating heterogeneous proxytypes and the dual process of
reasoning, in: In Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Ar-
tificial Intelligence (IJCAI), Buenos Aires, AAAI Press, 2015, pp. 875–881.
[44] A. Chella, A cognitive architecture for music perception exploiting con-
ceptual spaces, in: Applications of Conceptual Spaces, Springer, 2015, pp.
187–203.
[45] F. Zenker, P. Ga¨rdenfors, Applications of conceptual spaces - The case for
geometric knowledge representation, Springer, 2015.
[46] A. Lieto, D. P. Radicioni, V. Rho, Dual peccs: a cognitive system for
conceptual representation and categorization, Journal of Experimental &
Theoretical Artificial Intelligence 29 (2) (2017) 433–452.
[47] A. Lieto, A. Chella, M. Frixione, Conceptual spaces for cognitive archi-
tectures: A lingua franca for different levels of representation, Biologically
Inspired Cognitive Architectures 19 (2017) 1–9.
[48] J. A. Fodor, The present status of the innateness controversy, in: J. A.
Fodor (Ed.), Representations: Philosophical Essays on the Foundations of
40
Cognitive Science, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1981, Ch. 10, pp. 257 –
316.
[49] D. N. Osherson, E. E. Smith, On the adequacy of prototype theory as a
theory of concepts, Cognition 9 (1) (1981) 35–58.
[50] J. A. Fodor, Z. W. Pylyshyn, Connectionism and cognitive architecture: A
critical analysis, Cognition 28 (1-2) (1988) 3–71.
[51] M. Lewis, J. Lawry, Hierarchical conceptual spaces for concept combina-
tion, Artificial Intelligence 237 (2016) 204–227.
[52] J. Derrac, S. Schockaert, Inducing semantic relations from conceptual
spaces: a data-driven approach to plausible reasoning, Artificial Intelli-
gence 228 (2015) 66–94.
[53] A. Lieto, E. Mensa, D. P. Radicioni, A resource-driven approach for an-
choring linguistic resources to conceptual spaces, in: AI* IA 2016 Advances
in Artificial Intelligence, Springer, 2016, pp. 435–449.
[54] Y. Vinokurov, C. Lebiere, D. Wyatte, S. Herd, R. O’Reilly, Unsurpervised
learning in hybrid cognitive architectures, in: Workshops at the twenty-
sixth AAAI conference on artificial intelligence, 2012.
[55] R. C. O’Reilly, A. A. Petrov, J. D. Cohen, C. J. Lebiere, S. A. Herd,
T. Kriete, I. P. Calvo, J. Symons, How limited systematicity emerges: A
computational cognitive neuroscience approach.
[56] H. V. D. Parunak, P. Nielsen, S. Brueckner, R. Alonso, Hybrid multi-agent
systems: integrating swarming and bdi agents, in: International Workshop
on Engineering Self-Organising Applications, Springer, 2006, pp. 1–14.
[57] R. Wray, C. Lebiere, P. Weinstein, K. Jha, J. Springer, T. Belding, B. Best,
V. Parunak, Towards a complete, multi-level cognitive architecture, in:
Proceedings of the eighth international conference on cognitive modeling,
Ann Arbor, MI, 2007, pp. 325–330.
41
[58] S. Fahlman, Using scones multiple-context mechanism to emulate human-
like reasoning, in: First International Conference on Knowledge Science,
Engineering and Management (KSEM’06), Springer–Verlag (Lecture Notes
in AI), Guilin, China, 2006.
[59] F. Baader, D. Calvanese, D. L. Mcguinness, D. Nardi, P. F. Patel-Schneider
(Eds.), The Description Logic Handbook : Theory, Implementation and
Applications, Cambridge University Press, 2003.
[60] K. E. Stanovich, R. F. West, Advancing the rationality debate, Behavioral
and brain sciences 23 (05) (2000) 701–717.
[61] J. S. B. Evans, K. E. Frankish, In two minds: Dual processes and beyond.,
Oxford University Press, 2009.
[62] D. Kahneman, Thinking, fast and slow, Macmillan, 2011.
[63] E. Davis, Representations of commonsense knowledge, Morgan Kaufmann,
2014.
[64] M. Minsky, The emotion machine: Commonsense thinking, artificial intel-
ligence, and the future of the human mind, Simon and Schuster, 2007.
[65] S. Ohlsson, R. H. Sloan, G. Tura´n, D. Uber, A. Urasky, An approach
to evaluate ai commonsense reasoning systems., in: FLAIRS Conference,
2012.
[66] D. P. Radicioni, F. Garbarini, F. Calzavarini, M. Biggio, A. Lieto, K. Sacco,
D. Marconi, On Mental Imagery in Lexical Processing: Computational
Modeling of the Visual Load Associated to Concepts, in: G. Airenti,
B. Bara, G. Sandini, M. Cruciani (Eds.), Proceedings of the EuroAsian-
Pacific Joint Conference on Cognitive Science (EAP-COGSCI 2015), 2015,
pp. 181–186.
42
